Saturday, March 28, 2020

On the Hidden Benefits of the Coronavirus Epidemic (yes, there are some!)

Boy am I going to get slammed for this post! Oh, well, time to be unpopular.

The job of economists is to focus not just on visible costs and invisible benefits but also hidden costs and hidden benefits. Nowhere is this more important than now as we debate reopening the economy. I would say right now that too much has been made of the visible costs and benefits that would accrue from opening the economy or keeping it closed and not nearly enough is being said about the hidden costs and benefits. As to the hidden costs of maintaining the stay in place orders, we are likely going to see increased mental health issues arising from social distancing and isolation. We are a social species and denying us physical human contact can have a deleterious effect on our health. One study suggested that not holding your baby could lead to issues that span into adulthood by negatively impacting their DNA: https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/national/article186889938.html

That being said, I want to focus on the hidden benefits that are accruing to us. With fewer cars on the road, we can see the impact on demand for gas with the plunging gas prices (I just paid $1.25 a gallon for gas yesterday). This is good news for most Americans but horrendous news for workers in the oil industry but, on balance, the good that arises from lower gas prices for a country such as ours likely outweighs the ill effects. However, with fewer cars on the roads, we also get fewer traffic accidents. With more social distancing, we were see fewer cases of influenza, a disease that also kills tens of thousands of Americans each year (please note that I am not dismissing the coronavirus epidemic at all-the problem with coronavirus is that it is more virulent than the flu, more deadly, and, unlike the flu, we do not yet have a vaccine for it, but the point is that what works to stop the spread of the coronavirus also stops the spread of the flu). With fewer factories operating, we have lower carbon emissions, which should alleviate concerns (whether they are valid or invalid) over climate change. With more people working at home, we dramatically reduce commute times and with more parents at home, children are receiving better supervision than if they were in the care of others. All of these things benefits from social isolation need to be considered before we reopen the country for business. That being said, the negatives are stark and real as well. We are currently experiencing the greatest reduction in productive capability in world history, an outcome that, in the short-run at least, will dwarf that of even the Great Depression, so no, I am not making an argument to maintain these orders to stay at home.

That being said, however, we need to be careful about when we lift these orders and let data drive our decision-making rather than emotions. We can replace income lost from idling production for a short period of time (now if this goes on for more than a few months, we are definitely going to be in trouble but all indications are that we will be able to relax these restrictions if we can flatten the curve and thus contain the spread of the virus). We cannot replace lives that are lost or time that is lost from being with our children. So use this time that you are staying at home productively and re-connect with your kids if you have been lax about that. The time we spend with our children cannot be replaced, it cannot be deferred, and it will not accrue with compounded interest, unlike your income or wealth.

Why we need to stop worrying about the deficit (for now), stop worrying about who gets paid (for now), and just pay everyone (for now)

Regular readers of this irregular blog know that I am very concerned about the deficit and want government first and foremost to be fiscally responsible. I do not want to spend money unnecessarily and I want us not to waste it by paying people who do not need it. However, there is a good, a bad, and an ugly way to do this when you have a crisis such as we are in now. The ugly way is to try to balance the budget on the backs of those who are suffering (and indeed to try to have a balanced budget at all -- that is such a horrific idea in a crisis that few, if any, would embrace such a position at this point unless they were required to do so by low - for further details on this, see my original blog positing back in 2011 on "Why No No Taxes and 'Cut, Cap and Balance' is a Horrible Idea (from a Conservative Perspective)" but I digress). The bad way is to target relief to only those who "truly need it" such as we are currently doing. The good way is to pay everyone and then tax back the gains from those who do not need it at a later date as opposed to designing a large bureaucracy to figure out who is "deserving" and who is not.

Part of this is because there really is no good reason to develop such a bureaucracy in the first place. All that bureaucratic tape is wasteful, almost by definition, especially since you can tax back the gains on the other side and it introduces severe distortions and disincentives known as "benefits cliffs" that need to be approached with caution. Furthermore, the government can not know a priori what is happening right now. They can only now in arrears. However, circumstances can change quickly and if you give out aid to everyone and simply tax them after the fact you can account for that. Trying to determine whether someone needs it before the fact is much harder to do and introduces the problem of adverse selection with people engaging in behavior to make them APPEAR to be needy when they are not.

In crisis times, such as we are having right now, this problem is only magnified. Paying people based on their 2018 or even their 2019 incomes does not account for what their current income is and it is their current income and only their current income that matter right now. Another key issue has to do with the alacrity by which you deliver relief and with targeted relief the issue is that the more you target relief, the more bureaucratic red tape you have to go through, and the slower the actual gets out. As for why we should not just give money to the unemployed, there are people who still have jobs but who have had their hours (and incomes) cut as a result of this unprecedented crisis. While in 2007-9, we could point fingers at individual companies who caused it, this time the collateral damage is much greater and a lot of it has been caused by government orders that have shuttered 60% to 80% of all businesses in this country. That is not to blame the government. They did what they had to do to contain the virus (although they could have acted quicker both with the orders and the stimulus and if they had we might have already been emerging from this. However, they didn't and everyone else is left holding the bag).

What we really need to do is pay everyone a basic guaranteed income for the duration of the crisis and then figure out who didn't need it after all is said and done by making people pay it back over the next 3 to 5 years if they did not need it. Of course, in addition, we will all be paying it back for the next generation due to the larger budget deficit, which is why I am upset that we do not have guardrails on regarding the deficit during good times. I actually warned about this back in 2011 when I argued that "Why "No New Taxes" and Cut Cap and Balance is a Horrible Idea (from a Conservative Perspective)" but my fellow conservatives did not listen. As soon as they got into power, they merely decided to one-up Democrats and become the only truly fiscally irresponsible party in our country because fiscal irresponsibility onlyexists when you blow up the deficit during a fiscal expansion (for all the Democrats talk about being fiscally irresponsible by proposing socialistic ideas when they are out of power, they really do not act fiscally irresponsible when they are in power, unlike Republicans who talk a good game when they are out of power but who refuse to play it once they get into power - the utter hypocrisy of Republicans on this point makes me sick).

Now none of this means that I support Democrats in their policy aims because they are even more interested in simply providing targeted relief than are Republicans but unless and until the Republicans turn away from Trumpism and re-embrace conservatism by becoming fiscally responsible and promising to attack the deficit with a vengeance once this crisis is passed and only if they they actually follow through on that promise, I won't be voting for Republicans in the upcoming election. Not going to lie, I won't vote for Democrats either (I will vote Libertarian) but I would be happier with the Democrats in power since in recent history they have been better at fiscal conservatism than Republicans have been (though even Democrats need to be a lot more fiscally conservative going forward if we are going to extract us from this mess).

For those who want to read what I had to say about the last time we got ourselves into this mess (and thus prove to everyone that I am, in not anything, quite consistent on this point), see http://voice-of-reason-on-the-internet.blogspot.com/2011/07/

Tuesday, March 5, 2019

Why the "Abortion is Murder" Position can be Problematic

I happen to be pro-choice but I think I should lay out the legal problem faced when anyone argues that “abortion is murder” but then turns around and tries to argue that it is acceptable in the case of rape, incest, saving the life of the mother, ensuring the health of the mother, or for birth defect reasons.  Perhaps I am missing something that people who are pro-life think, but do believe that it is important to deal with this from the standpoint of the law and why the “abortion is murder” argument is highly problematic for those who want some exceptions (it is perfectly consistent if you demand that there be absolutely no exceptions whatsoever regardless of the circumstances, though this does lead to a different problem and that is the denial of the mother’s agency, but I will leave that for another time and place).

Necessity is different from self-defense.  One can never murder a person simply in order to survive even if the only way to survive is to terminate the life of one of the individuals.  For example, if you were in an escape room with eight others and the only way to escape the room is to have one person murdered (you are not allowed to kill yourself to save the others), the law would treat this as a murder, even though, by necessity, the only way for seven of you to survive is to kill one.

On the other hand, if someone does try to kill you so as to escape the room, you are permitted to defend yourself since self-defense is a valid defense to murder.  Thus, ironically, the only way out of such an escape room is to kill the person who is trying to kill you.

Since fetuses do not try to kill their host mother, self-defense is not a valid defense even to save the mother’s life.  However, if the mother were to try to kill the fetus, the fetus would under the law be allowed to then kill the mother in self-defense.  This presents a problem, of course, since the fetus often cannot survive without the mother.

Hopefully, this comment helps people understand the issue that pro-life individuals need to face when dealing with the exceptions of rape, incest, and saving the life of the mother, which is why there are really only two tenable positions in the pro-life/pro-choice debate: either you believe that abortion is murder, in which case there can be absolutely no exceptions, or you believe that abortion is not murder.  If you believe that abortion is not murder, you may still set limitations on abortion but these then must be based on public policy arguments (i.e., likely a utilitarian calculus).

To understand from where I get the “necessity is not a defense to murder” argument, please see the court case of R v Dudley and Stephens (1884).

Monday, March 4, 2019

The Complicated Story of How Much Twenty Dollars Actually is with Respect to the 7th Amendment to the US Constitution

The 7th Amendment to the US Constitution provides that "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law."

So what does this mean? Well, going by the Coinage Act of 1792, that established a dollar as being at parity with the Spanish dollar (after considering the wear and tear on the coin), it might be that we ought to use the current rate of silver to establish what a proper value is in interpreting the clause. However, there is a problem:

The Constitution actually says “twenty dollars”, not 20 dollar coins. Why is this important? Well, the same Coinage Act of 1792 allows for the minting of $10 GOLD coins (called Eagles) that weigh 16.04g pure or 17.5g standard gold. So there is actually a discrepancy and thus it is subject to interpretation whether in a world where the value of silver and gold fluctuate relative to one another (sorry – the US Constitution really cannot change that singular fact). Given the current world price of Gold and Silver, we can EITHER choose to use gold OR silver. I think it is best to choose gold. As I write this, the value of silver is a mere $0.49 per gram of pure silver based on federal reserve notes (I will leave the Constitutionality of fiat for another day but let’s just say that we are using our current fiat money for sake of argument). That leads us to a value today in terms of the 7th Amendment of $0.49/g x 24.1 x 20 = . $236.18.


Oh, and the coinage act allows us to use copper for pennies, which at $0.01/g x 17.1 x 2000 = $342.00


Finally, we can use gold, which based on today’s value would lead us to a value for the 7th Amendment of $41.63 x 16.04 x 2 = $1,335.49.

Now let’s compare that to what the value would be in dollars based on inflation rates (and thus allowing for fiat currency and a strict literal reading of “dollar” but placing it in terms of real value from the Coinage Act of 1792):

$100 in 1792 is equivalent to $510.67 based on the data from this website: https://www.officialdata.org/1792-dollars-in-2017

Hmm….maybe our fiat money isn’t so bad after all in terms of holding up its value relative to gold, silver and copper as we might at first think.

Oh, but it gets EVEN MORE INTERESTING. Why? Well read Article I, Section 10 of the US Constitution that states:

“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.”

So the Federal government was issuing a coin (in copper) that could not be used as “a Tender in Payment of Debts” in any state. Hmm…. Seems like those copper coins were a problem….

In any case, though, it makes sense to use gold, not silver, as the basis for addressing the 7th Amendment because there literally is nothing in the US Constitution that says that we ought to base these decisions on the price of silver. This is also true because a twenty dollar GOLD coin (called a Double Eagle) was used in Spain at that time. The whole “regulate the value thereof” clause was designed to maintain a silver coin’s parity with gold, since you can really only have one standard, not a bimetal standard unless the price of gold and silver are in a fixed exchange rate. Unfortunately, they are not and they cannot be made to be in a fixed exchange rate.

Indeed, the mere fact that the $10 coin was a gold coin argues that the Constitutional provision should be read with gold, rather than silver, in mind.

Wednesday, March 7, 2018

Can a completely free economy that conforms to the classical liberal ideal be successful?

There are two problems with this question. The first problem is the definition of the word, “successful”.  What do you mean by that?  The second problem is the conflating of two similar, but nevertheless separate and distinct, ideas: “a completely free economy” and “Classical Liberalism.".

While the answer to whether it will be “successful” depends on your definition of success, the problem of your conflation of the two ideas means that “a completely free economy" cannot be a “Classical Liberal” economy.  Classical liberalism traditionally requires some laws regulating trade, though these the minimum actually necessary to do so, and that furthermore such laws are neutral ones with respect to trade.  That means that while a classical liberal economy would not provide for a minimum wage law or for anti-cartel legislation, it also would not prevent the formation and functioning of labor unions.  Here is what Adam Smith wrote on cartels but which equally works for labor unions:

“People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law which either could be executed, or would be consistent with liberty and justice. But though the law cannot hinder people of the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much less to render them necessary.”

Now read this carefully because it isn’t something that most conservatives want to admit but this passage applies equally well to business cartels or to labor unions.  Both are anathema to liberty and yet legislating against either would also be anathema to liberty.  Instead the government should neither favor the producer nor the consumer in such matters.  As John Stuart Mill wrote:

“[T]rade is a social act. Whoever undertakes to sell any description of goods to the public, does what affects the interest of other persons, and of society in general; and thus his conduct, in principle, comes within the jurisdiction of society... both the cheapness and the good quality of commodities are most effectually provided for by leaving the producers and sellers perfectly free, under the sole check of equal freedom to the buyers for supplying themselves elsewhere. This is the so-called doctrine of Free Trade, which rests on grounds different from, though equally solid with, the principle of individual liberty asserted in this Essay. Restrictions on trade, or on production for purposes of trade, are indeed restraints; and all restraint, qua restraint, is an evil...”

Yet, even still, what to do about what we refer to as “natural monopolies”, those ones that naturally would arise out of a monopoly?  Well, Adam Smith has an answer there as well:

“A monopoly granted either to an individual or to a trading company has the same effect as a secret in trade or manufactures. The monopolists, by keeping the market constantly under-stocked, by never fully supplying the effectual demand, sell their commodities much above the natural price, and raise their emoluments, whether they consist in wages or profit, greatly above their natural rate.”

Now notice what this would entail if carried forth properly.  There could be no government monopolies granted, such as you see in cable television, water, sewer, etc.  So does that mean that we have a “completely free economy”?  It certainly sounds like it, right?  However, go back and read what Mill write, “under the sole check of equal freedom to the buyers for supplying themselves elsewhere.”  Where monopolies do arise, for whatever reason, there is definitely a right asserted under classical liberalism that such monopolies can be regulated.  Thus, while governments ought not grant monopolies, I see nothing in Smith, Mill, Ricardo, or any other proponent of classical economics and classical liberalism that monopoly power cannot be checked to some degree.
There are further limitations placed by classical liberalism on trade even though it is not something we always put forth.  Classical liberalism does not allow for force or fraud in economy dealing or political matters.  Certainly if I am not allowed to defraud you that is a limitation on my “freedom” but that is because freedom itself cannot be used to infringe upon the freedom of others.  Similarly, you do not have the “freedom” under classical liberalism to break contracts without being liable to being hauled into court and forced by the government to provide compensation based on the harm that you caused the other party.  Classical liberalism in these regards simply does not allow for a “completely free economy.”

So let’s get back to your original question, as asked.  Yes, an economy based on classical liberalism absolutely can thrive and indeed, the ideals of classical liberalism are found (for the most part) in America’s founding document, the US Constitution, and these same ideas were present in Great Britain during the first half of the 19th century.  The problem occurred not with classical liberalism but rather from deviations from it.  The major industrial companies that rose in the latter half of the 19th century obtained their monopolies through government intervention initially by the railroads (countermanding the express argument that monopolies ought not be granted by government).  Interestingly, the classical liberals had a solution to such matters as well.  Please read Adam Smith, once again, on infrastructure. If you read this carefully, you will find that Adam Smith, while preferring private ownership to public ownership, nevertheless did not allow such infrastructure to be billed out without some regulation as to its pricing:

”When the carriages which pass over a highway or a bridge, and the lighters which sail upon a navigable canal, pay toll in proportion to their weight or their tunnage, they pay for the maintenance of those public works exactly in proportion to the wear and tear which they occasion of them. It seems scarce possible to invent a more equitable way of maintaining such works.”

So that helps us take care of bridges, highways, and railroads.  Note that even if private owners were
put in charge of such things, classical liberalism definitely allows for regulation of the pricing of infrastructure.

What about “natural monopolies”, those parts of infrastructure that naturally would occur and how do we deal with the case where individuals cannot pay the costs of such infrastructure, what then?  What about, for example, individual streets within a city?  Does it make sense to set up a toll road everywhere?  How about the provision of water or sewer service where we wish to provide it to the poor for purposes of health and safety and yet the poor cannot afford it? Once again, Adam Smith provides the answer:

“Even those public works which are of such a nature that they cannot afford any revenue for maintaining themselves, but of which the conveniency is nearly confined to some particular place or district, are always better maintained by a local or provincial revenue, under the management of a local and provincial administration, than by the general revenue of the state, of which the executive power must always have the management. Were the streets of London to be lighted and paved at the expence of the treasury, is there any probability that they would be so well lighted and paved as they are at present, or even at so small an expence?”

So, we have taken care of the problem of monopolies (do not grant them or if you cannot avoid them due to the natural monopoly occurring, do not allow their monopoly to be used to fleece the public but instead require their monopolies to be in service to the public).  We have also now placed capital and labor on equal footing by allowing both cartels and unions and thus checking each group’s power against one another (though we should not encourage the formation of either).  We have stopped trade based on fraud or misrepresentation.  What else is there?

Are you worried because workers aren’t going to be paid enough to live?  Whose fault is that?  Do the workers not have the right under classical liberalism to form a union?  They do such a right.  Do the workers not have the ability to work elsewhere?  They do have such an ability.  Furthermore, do not forget that if you set up a law that provides that workers are guaranteed a minimum income, what about the workers who work for themselves?  Should they not be guaranteed a minimum income? Why are they disadvantaged in such matters merely because they work for everyone rather than for one person? What about the capitalists?  Why are they not guaranteed a minimum profit?  After all, most owners of businesses today make little or no more than workers do because businesses are small sole proprietorships.

Are you worried that people will not be able to rent?  You should know that classical liberals detested landlords arguing that “they made money in their sleep.”  Yet how would you deal with it?  If you regulate the rent to be charged, the landlord can merely refuse to rent but instead will sell.  That will ensure less space for the poor and more for the rich.  Once again, do people not have the right to move elsewhere?  Do people not have the right to buy their own property?  Do people not have the right to do with their property what they will?

It is the fundamental restrictions on liberty that leads to economic desolation.  Look at what happened after “land reform” in Zimbabwe - the bread basket of Africa became a wasteland of famine.

Zimbabwe's Man-Made Famine

Really, my question would be to turn this whole question around: is it really possible to say that societies that have eschewed classical liberalism can be successful?

The fact is that prior to classical liberalism become the mainstream political thought in the 19th century, living standards for ordinary people worldwide had been stagnant for thousands of years.  The ordinary Londoner in the 1750s was only marginally better than the ordinary Roman at the time of Jesus:

“Until 1500, as best we can tell, there had been next to no growth in output per worker for the average human for millennia. Even in 1800 the average human had a material standard of living (and an economic productivity level) at best twice that of the average human in the year 1. The problem was not that there was no technological progress. There was. Humans have long been ingenious. Warrior, priestly, and bureaucratic elites in 1800 lived much better than their counterparts in previous millennia had lived. But just because the ruling elite lived better does not mean that other people lived any better. Only after 1800 do we see large sustained increases in worldwide standards of living.”

Source:
Delong - Economic Growth and History

What happened when classical liberalism was in ascend during the 19th century was astounding and it continued well into the 20th century:

“Average rates of material output per capita, which grew at perhaps 0.15 percent per year between 1500 and 1800, grew at roughly 1 percent per year worldwide between 1800 and 1900 and at an average pace of about 2 percent per year worldwide between 1900 and 2000.”

Now it is properly noted that classical liberalism was in retreat in many nation states between about 1930 and 2000.  However, it remained the major force for global trade restriction reductions that have driven economic growth in most  countries and have propelled our worldwide income increase in the past 70 years.  Today, we are starting to see the manifestations of a retreat not only at the nation-state level but also on the global level in terms of free trade.  This should worry all of us because it is the (fairly) unfettered ability to trade freely that has lifted economic standards for billions.

You might not like the distributional consequences of classical liberalism but no system is perfect.  Yet, all classical liberalism actually did was unleash economic growth.  How that growth was distributed was the result of societal structures that transcend the classical liberal framework.  Yet rather than rectify these societal structures that have little to do with classical liberalism, we create laws that restrict the very economic growth that has lifted billions out of poverty. Those of us who are classical liberals would argue that the cure for such distributional consequences may be worse than the disease.

So how would this classical liberal “fix” the distributional consequences?  The easy and desirable answer from my perspective is not to do it at all.  Distributional consequences are a natural byproduct of liberty and is it not better to have more than you otherwise would (and we all have more thanks to the ability to freely trade) even if your neighbor has much, much, much more?  Why are you so concerned with what other have rather than just be thankful that you have more than you would have under a system that restricted, or even worse, eschewed, individual liberty?

However I realize that is not a satisfactory answer for most people.  That is why I favor, if I must do something about it, the promulgation of a negative income tax (aka guaranteed minimum income).  What I am not willing to do, however, is provide bountiful public services and subsidies across an array of goods because I personally think that the poor ought to have them.  Give them money and allow them to decide for themselves what they want, whether it be healthcare (beyond certain minimums such as provision of vaccines that protect us all and emergency care that really is not a transaction between a willing buyer and a willing seller, both able to go to a competitor if a meeting of the minds cannot occur), food, or shelter, all of which are now provided to some degree by the state through direct intervention, subsidization, or voucher programs.  If someone wishes to have a smaller living space in order to eat a little more, who am I to say otherwise?  Who am I to dictate that one must eat a certain proportion or amount of foods and if those foods are not to nutritional standards, even if they are still food, who am I to say that you cannot have such food?  After all, I do not place restrictions on what the middle class may procure so why am I assuming that just because someone is poor that somehow they are also mentally incompetent?  Similarly, who am I to dictate that you may not reside in a particular home because I deem it of squalor when I am not willing to preclude everyone regardless of income  from doing the same.  When we place restrictions on what one consumes, solely on the basis of income and the fact that someone is granted something from the public purse, is this not the very height of arrogance and hostility to the poor?

Would your answer change if you were somehow legally obligated to those 200 people? Say you were a doctor who was in charge of those people?

My thanks to dhruv on a most excellent question!

That does APPEAR to pose a problem, doesn't it?  However, then the question is a Hobson's Choice: you clearly have a legal obligation to your own family as well!
Let me pose you a different question: would you save one of your children over another given that if you do not choose, you lose them both?

Can you be found morally wrong for choosing one life over another when you cannot save both?  I actually do not think that you can.

Such was the issue in the movie, Sophie's Choice, and her choice haunted her for the rest of her life.  However, the choice to give up the daughter rather than the son to the Nazis was not the real dilemma.  It was her willingness to engage with the vile Nazi in the first instance.  By attempting to curry favor with evil, she caused the loss of her daughter.

Still, what you ask is an excellent question.  I am not a believer that one should merely do things because the law demands it - after all, the law itself could be immoral.  If I strictly chose to follow the law in all matters, that would have made me a deontologist when it comes to ethics.  Instead, I evaluate things through three different lenses and ask three different questions:

1. What does the law require of me?  In the case of your question, the law requires that I save both but I cannot save both.  If I help the 200 random strangers, I have actually committed murder of my child.  If I help my child, I have actually murdered 200 random strangers.  While one has more people than the other, the piling on of murders is, strictly speaking, not a legal question but rather a question of consequences, which I will detail in the next question I would ask. As such, the law's requirements are immaterial. DEONTOLOGICAL ETHICS DOES NOT HELP ME HERE.  Note, however, I would still argue that under natural law, I owe a greater allegiance to my own kin than to any stranger, so deontological ethics actually STILL suggests that the very question itself is wrong - I cannot owe a greater legal responsibility to others than to my own flesh and blood but, for the sake of argument, I will allow us to consider this equal balancing of responsibilities and see how it plays out.

2. What about the outcome of it all? Pure utilitarian ethics suggests that I ought to save the 200 random individuals, I am obviously not a pure utilitarian. Still, the problem is that I now have a legal obligation to both groups.  Having earlier rejected the saving of 200 random strangers, we now must weight carefully this decision.  From that utilitarian calculus, it would strongly suggest that we ought to value 200 lives over 1.  CONSEQUENTIALIST ETHICS SUGGESTS HELPING THE 200 PEOPLE.

3. Could I respect my decision later?  If I were to choose the random strangers over my own child, I could not respect that decision.  I would consider myself to be a bad person for having done so.  I would not in the least regret the loss of life of 200 to save my 1 child provided I have merely refused to assist as opposed to actively decided to kill.  VIRTUE ETHICS SUGGESTS SAVING MY CHILD.

So now I have the ultimate issue for me: I use a three-legged stool (deontological ethics, consequentialism, and virtue ethics) approach to ethics.  When all three are in alignment, I know that what I am doing is ethical.  When two of the three are in alignment (as in my previous example), I know that it is more likely than not that it is the correct decision.  When I have a split, ethical considerations suggest that neither side is more ethical.  It ceases (for me) to be an ethical question at all. That means that I would still choose my child.  If it is not a question of ethics, then it is not unethical to do so.

Yet, your question does pose an interesting alternative scenario: why I am willing to allow 200 people to die but not to even actively murder even 1?  Let us return to how this differs from when I said that I would not murder another to save my child:

The real point would be whether I am legally obligated for the murder of my child or not if I refused.  I a madman is holding my daughter hostage and demanding that I kill someone else or else he will kill my daughter and assuming that I literally cannot take action against the madman (always the preferable course of action!), then the question is: would I be legally responsible for her murder if refused to carry out the murder of say ONE people to save her?  The answer from a legal perspective is clear: I would not.  Thus in that case deontological ethics says "don't murder", consequentialist ethics is neutral (one life is no different than another - but note that if there is the murder of more than one, the calculus decidedly goes in favor of the strangers), and virtue ethics also says "don't murder" because while I would love to have my daughter in my arms, I would definitely not be able to respect my decision to murder 200 people even to save my own child.
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Finally, let us consider the perverted regime where the law and morality are not in alignment.  This is really the only scenario where I make an "unethical" choice from the perspective of my ethical framework:

You see if my legal obligation is to strangers MORE than my own kin or even EQUAL to my own kin, I would have to say that the "law is an ass" in the case.  I would now have to appeal to natural law over manmade law.  Once again, under natural law, I owe nothing to others except in the special relationship that exists within the family.  As such, I would never owe a duty to 200 strangers that could possibly override my duty to my own family.  That is how I would "solve" this "problem".
From Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments:

“Let us suppose that the great empire of China, with all its myriads of inhabitants, was suddenly swallowed up by an earthquake, and let us consider how a man of humanity in Europe, who had no sort of connection with that part of the world, would be affected upon receiving intelligence of this dreadful calamity.

He would, I imagine, first of all, express very strongly his sorrow for the misfortune of that unhappy people, he would make many melancholy reflections upon the precariousness of human life, and the vanity of all the labours of man, which could thus be annihilated in a moment. He would too, perhaps, if he was a man of speculation, enter into many reasonings concerning the effects which this disaster might produce upon the commerce of Europe, and the trade and business of the world in general. And when all this fine philosophy was over, when all these humane sentiments had been once fairly expressed, he would pursue his business or his pleasure, take his repose or his diversion, with the same ease and tranquility, as if no such accident had happened.
The most frivolous disaster which could befall him would occasion a more real disturbance. If he was to lose his little finger to-morrow, he would not sleep to-night; but, provided he never saw them, he will snore with the most profound security over the ruin of a hundred millions of his brethren, and the destruction of that immense multitude seems plainly an object less interesting to him, than this paltry misfortune of his own.

To prevent, therefore, this paltry misfortune to himself, would a man of humanity be willing to sacrifice the lives of a hundred millions of his brethren, provided he had never seen them? Human nature startles with horror at the thought, and the world, in its greatest depravity and corruption, never produced such a villain as could be capable of entertaining it. But what makes this difference? When our passive feelings are almost always so sordid and so selfish, how comes it that our active principles should often be so generous and so noble? When we are always so much more deeply affected by whatever concerns ourselves, than by whatever concerns other men; what is it which prompts the generous, upon all occasions, and the mean upon many, to sacrifice their own interests to the greater interests of others?

It is not the soft power of humanity; it is not that feeble spark of benevolence which Nature has lighted up in the human heart that is thus capable of counteracting the strongest impulses of self-love. It is a stronger power, a more forcible motive, which exerts itself upon such occasions. It is reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitant of the breast, the man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct. It is he who, whenever we are about to act so as to affect the happiness of others, calls to us, with a voice capable of astonishing the most presumptuous of our passions, that we are but one of the multitude, in no respect better than any other in it; and that when we prefer ourselves so shamefully and so blindly to others, we become the proper objects of resentment, abhorrence, and execration.
It is from him only that we learn the real littleness of ourselves, and of whatever relates to ourselves, and the natural misrepresentations of self-love can be corrected only by the eye of this impartial spectator. It is he who shows us the propriety of generosity and the deformity of injustice; the propriety of resigning the greatest interests of our own, for the yet greater interests of others, and the deformity of doing the smallest injury to another, in order to obtain the greatest benefit to ourselves.
It is not the love of our neighbour; it is not the love of mankind, which upon many occasions prompts us to the practice of those divine virtues. It is a stronger love, a more powerful affection, which generally takes place upon such occasions; the love of what is honourable and noble, of the grandeur, and dignity, and superiority of our own characters.”

Sunday, March 4, 2018

Would you rather save your child and let 200 random strangers die, or save the strangers but let your child die? Why?

I save my child. Every single day I “let” thousands of people die because I do not save them. That doesn’t mean I could save them but I still did nothing to try to stop them from dying and I do not think a second about them. However, my children are precious to me and I would do anything I could to save them that does not involve murdering another*. If I am in a position to save a person at no risk to anyone else other than myself I will try to save them but if I am asked to choose between one or more individuals, I refuse to employ an objective utilitarian calculus based on pure numbers. If I have to choose who to save it is based solely on their relationship to me. If the two groups are of no importance to me, I will choose the group that is easier for me to save. If saving them requires equal difficulty, my choice will be whichever group is to my right (because I am right-handed), even if that group is smaller in number. After all, the life of those 200 strangers you saved could include a child who grows up to be just like Hitler while the child would died would have grown up to be just like Gandhi and if you consciously saved Hitler and allowed Gandhi to die using a utilitarian calculus based on the greatest number of individuals to be saved, how could you live with yourself?
*Refusing to intervene to save someone is not murder in most cases. I have no legal duty to save the life of another person except for someone who is legally connected to me such as my child. In other words, my legal (as well as moral) duty is to save my child and not the 200 random strangers.